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Monthly Archives: September 2011

Grieķijā steidzami atjauno Partenonu. Būvi pirmatnējā izskatā cer pabeigt 2112. gadā, bet “vecspāru” svētki paredzami jau novembrī. No “Dienvidjūru ceļa piezīmēm”.

 

Saulains pievakars Viļņā. No laukumu foto virknes.

 

Latviskas ziņas par personu Бонифаций Даукштс “gūglā”. Interesantas fantāzijas dažviet. Un austrumu mīti.

 

Pieturā.

 

Boriss Sokolovs: Baltijas okupācijas fakts nav apšaubāms. Mīti par 2. pasaules karu Krievijas historiogrāfijā tiek uzturēti. Referāta Latvijas Vēsturnieku 1. kongresā autorizētas tēzes – www.demoshistoria.lv galvenajam redaktoram.

RigaHistCongress2011

Boris V. Sokolov

The main myths of the modern Russian historiography of the Second World War

The main myths of the Soviet historiography of the Great Patriotic War were in some cases only slightly transformed in modern Russian historiography. The most obvious changes occurred in the myth of peaceful Soviet policy on the eve and at the beginning of the Second World War. After the recognizing the existence of the secret protocols to the Soviet-German treaties of 1939, they were declared worthless by the 3rd Congress of the People’s Deputies of the USSR in 1989. The Russian historians of democratic orientation condemned this protocols. They justifiably state that the Soviet Union divided the Eastern Europe with Hitler and that the Soviet aggression against Finland and annexation of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and the Baltic States were the consequences of the secret protocols. But most of democratic historians are afraid to use a term “occupation” towards those Soviet actions. The historians of the democratic trend consider that the conclusion of the non-aggression pact with Hitler was Stalin’s great mistake which was one of the main causes of the suddenness of the German attack in June, 1941 and of the heavy Soviet defeats of the first years of the Great Patriotic War. Most of the democratic (or liberal-democratic) Russian historians also shared the old Soviet myth that Stalin was afraid of Hitler and tried at any expense to prevent or postpone the inevitable German attack against the Soviet Union.

The historians of the national-patriotic trend now recognize the existence of the secret protocols. But they consider that these protocols, as well as the non-aggression pact, were necessary as a guarantee of the Soviet security and interests. The national-patriotic historians think that there was a real threat that the United Kingdom and France would achieved an anti-Soviet agreement with Germany and that is why Stalin had to conclude a non-aggression pact with Hitler. The annexation of the Baltic States and other territories under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact they treat as a free will of the peoples, although now the historians of this trend have to specify that there were different positions towards the Soviet Union among the population of the annexed territories. Some people greeted the Red Army, others hated the Soviets, but practically all the people were afraid of Germans and hoped that the Red Army would prevent German invasion to their countries. By the way, the last thesis, as we think, is close to reality and also supported by the historians of democratic trend.

The other thesis, which is common for most historians of both trends, is that Stalin’s intentions were limited by the former borders of the Russian Empire and that he was not an active participant of the outbreak and the first months of the Second War, but followed both the German and Western powers steps and reacted on the situation, which was constructed without his participation. The difference between two trends is that national-patriots justify both Stalin’s intentions to restore borders of the Russian Empire and his methods of decision of such task. They explain their position by the statement that such methods were using by all the great powers on the eve and during the Second World War. Contrary to that, democrats consider that Stalin should be strongly condemned for violation of international law and using methods of aggression and threat of use of force. Alexander B. Shirokorad, Natalija A. Narochnitskaja, Alexander R. Djukov, Alexej Isaev and Igor V. Pyhalov are among prominent representatives of the national-patriotic trend1

Representative of the national-patriotic trend Jurij A. Nikiforov thinks that “the main question is the question of the Soviet intentions. To what extent the actions of the Soviet leadership were reactions to the circumstances, which did not depend on its will, and to what extent its actions were defined by the ideological and other preferences of Stalin and his surrounding”2. He obviously is supporter of theory of the Soviet actions on the eve and at the beginning of the Second World War, forced by circumstances. Nikiforov quite artificially opposes “the Soviet leadership” to Stalin, but it is commonly known that in 1939 the only Soviet leader and decision-maker was Stalin. Nobody else could make decision and take actions.

The only representative of the national-patriotic trend, who considers that Stalin was preparing to attack Hitler in 1941, is Michail I. Mel’tuchov, but he also thinks that Stalin’s plans were limited by the borders of the former Russian Empire3.

The historians of the democratic trend more rarely turn to the history of the Second World War. One of the main causes of such situation is the lack of clear concept of the role and aims of the Soviet Union in World War II. That is why the most interesting works were devoted to the military, not to political history. The works of Lev N. Lopuchovskij, devoted to Kursk and Vjaz’ma battles4, the works of Andrej A. Smirnov, devoted to comparison of combat effectiveness of the Soviet Air Forces and the Luftwaffe and to comparison of combat training of the Red Army in 1931-1936 and in 1937-19415, as well as the book of Alexej S. Stepanov, devoted to the development of the Soviet Air Forces in 1938-19416, should be mentioned. The authors of these works prove that the combat ability of the Red Army, including the Soviet Air Forces, was much worse than the combat ability of the Wehrmacht, including the Luftwaffe. It destroys the old Soviet myth, which is repeated by both the Russian authorities and the historians of the national-patriotic trend, that the Red Army had superiority over the Wehrmacht in the combat ability, combat training and level of command, at least from the end of 1942. Andrej A. Smirnov also proves that the level of combat training and command in the Red Army in the first half of 1930s was not higher than in 1939-1941, after the campaign of the Great terror of 1937-1938. He shows that the comparatively low level of the Soviet combat training and command was caused deeper defects of the Soviet system and the Red Army, as a part of this system. These defects were partly generated yet in the Russian Imperial Army.

It should be also mentioned the works of democratic historians Natalii S. Lebedeva, Inessa S. Jazhborovskaja, Anatolij Ju. Yablokov, Valentina S. Parsadanova, devoted to the Katyn crime. These historians found the documents, which unconditionally proved the Soviet guilty for this crime against humanity7.

It is characteristic that most of the Russian historians of the Second World War use the foreign languages’ sources only on very rare occasions. For example, Michail Meltuhov in his book about Bessarabian problem has practically used none of the Romanian sources, including those of them, which were translated into other European languages. The main cause of such nihilism among the historians of the national-patriotic trend is not the lack of knowledge of the foreign languages. The most important cause is their aspiration to state that Russia (the Soviet Union) was always right and its enemies were always wrong.

The historians of the democratic trend Lev N. Lopuhovskij and Boris Kavalerchik prove that the Red Army would be destroyed if it attacked Germany in 1941, because its level of combat training was much lower than the Wehrmacht’s one. But the mentioned historians are sure that Stalin did not intend to attack Hitler in 1941 and tried to postpone the inevitable Soviet-German clash8.

But, contrary to this hypothesis, the Soviet position in the relations with Germany was very active in the second half of 1940, already after France’s defeat, and in the first half of 1941. Stalin occupied and annexed the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. He tried to receive Hitler’s consent to the Soviet occupation of Finland and pretended to the sphere of influence on the Balkans, including Bulgaria and the Black Sea straits. Those Soviet demands were one of the causes of Hitler’s decision to attack the Soviet Union in 1941. If Stalin was really afraid of Hitler’s attack, then he did not pursue such provocative policy.

As we think, Stalin’s real intentions were just the same, as Hitler’s ones. So his occupation and annexation of Western Ukraine, Western Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, part of Karelia, military aggression against Finland are just the same as Hitler’s annexation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, aggression against Poland, Norway etc. So the Soviet arguments about the necessity of providing security are false, like German ones. There are enough facts now which prove that the Soviet Union were going to attack Germany in 1940-1941. It should be mentioned that yet in March, 1941 deputy chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Nikolai F. Vatutin, made a very telling inscription on the text of the plan of strategic deployment of the Red Army in the West: “Begin offensive on 12 June”9. The other important fact is that on 4 June, 1941 Politburo decided to form a Polish division of the Red Army before 1 July. This fact may be explained only by the supposition that the Soviet Union planned to begin war against Germany in July 194110. In the same way, on 26 October 1939, exactly one month before the Soviet provocation in Mainila, People’s Commissar of Defense Kliment E. Voroshilov issued an order on the formation of 106th Special Rifle Corps, using the Finnish and Karelian population of the USSR. On 23 November, the Finnish corps, which had been formed, was renamed 1st Mountain Rifle Corps11.

The only Stalin’s mistake was the incorrect estimation of possible date of the German attack against the Soviet Union. But this mistake was not fatal for his regime, because the situation of June, 1941 guaranteed that the United States and the British Empire had become the Soviet allies. And Anti-Hitler Coalition had enough resources for the victory, as a result of which Stalin occupied Eastern Europe and put control over Eastern Asia.

Director of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences Alexander O. Chubarjan is one of the rare representatives of the pure official historical science. He is closer to the democratic trend in the condemnation of Stalin’s crimes. But Chubarjan, like historians of the national-patriotic trend, partly justify the Soviet policy on the eve and at the beginning of the Second World War and refuse to recognize the fact of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States and some other territories. He prefers to say about incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the Soviet Union, but not about their annexation. Chubarjan also denies the existence of Stalin’s plans to attack Germany in 1940-194112.

Even democratic historians avoid any comparison with the so called “peaceful occupation” of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Denmark by Hitler’s Germany in 1938-1940. If we compare mentioned German occupation with the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, we shall see practically the full coincidence of those events. But the Russian historians don’t want to use the term “occupation” towards Stalin’s actions of 1939-1940, because they don’t want to conflict with the Russian official structures. Moscow does not recognize the fact of the Soviet occupation of the Polish, Finnish, Romanian, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian territories in 1939-1940. Modern Russia is a successor of the Soviet Union and does not want to pay for the Soviet crimes. We should remember that the German “peaceful occupation” of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Denmark was strongly condemned by the Nuremberg tribunal.

It should be stressed that the recognition of non-occupation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 1940-1991 is practically impossible for the modern Baltic States, because then their juridical continuation with the pre-war States would be challenged.

For example, Russian liberal historian Elena Ju. Zubkova’s book is practically first objective serious publication in Russia, devoted to Baltic countries under the Soviet rule. But she is sure that the period of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States lasted only about two months – from bringing of the Soviet troops to the territories of the Baltic States after ultimatums in June, 1940 and till the formal annexation in August, 1940. Zubkova understands the term “occupation” only as interim military occupation, when an occupied territory under the control of military authorities13. But she ignored the meaning of word “occupation” as seizure of a country against will of its population. Word “occupation” was used in such meaning in Nuremberg sentence.

The appraisal of the Russian and other Soviet collaborationists connected with the appraisal of the Soviet role in the outbreak of the war and its war aims. Some Russian historians, including, for example Kirill Alexandrov and Sergej I. Verevkin, considered Russian collaborationists, like general Andrej A. Vlasov and Bronislav V. Kaminskij, as true Russian patriots and heroic fighters against criminal totalitarian Communist regime14. Most of democratic historians and practically all the historians of the national-patriotic trend strongly condemned the Russian collaborationists as traitors, careerists and self-seekers, because they collaborated with the criminal Nazi regime. That is why they also condemned the collaborationists from the other Soviet peoples: Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, etc.15. May be, late Mihail I. Semirjaga is the only representative of democratic trend, who condemned Russian collaborationists, but partly justified collaborationists from the other Soviet peoples, including the Baltic peoples, as suppressed by Stalin’s regime16.

It should be stressed that the main part of the most important documents of the period of 1939-1945 are still classified in the Russian archives. That is why practically no important document, connected with the highest level of military-political leadership during 1939-1945, was published after 2000. It should be mentioned that the International Fond “Democracy”, founded by Alexander N. Yakovlev, one of the main architects of “Perestrojka”, published some interesting collections of documents, devoted to the period of the Second World War. But they included only those top secret documents of the Soviet leadership, which were published in 1990s17.

The other important problem, which is discussed in modern historiography, is the problem who was the real architect of the Victory, Stalin or the Soviet people18. The democratic historians state that the Soviet people won the victory in spite of Stalin. For example, Gennadij Bordugov thinks that the people and the Stalinist political system were two interlacing forces. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the political system was the main but rather ineffective force. Then, after the first heavy defeats of the Red Army, the people became the main force. The people generated military leaders and paid for the victory by mass heroism and dozen of millions lives. The people force liberated and the force of political system, which followed the people force, suppressed. But at the final stage of the war the political system had taken the victory from people’s hands. And the people have no mechanism for overthrowing bankrupt government in 1941 and keep the Victory in 194519.

As we think, the thesis about two forces, people and Stalinist political system, is correct. But the opposition of the people and Stalin (or Stalinist political system) is rather artificial. In reality the people was controlled by the political system during the whole war. And the military leaders were not generated by the people but were chosen by Stalin himself. And Stalin was the architect of the victory, because he was the only decision-maker in the Soviet Union. The totalitarian political system was his instrument and the people were the necessary material for the victory. The totalitarian system guaranteed both the firmness of the Soviet State under crucial circumstances and the ability of the people uncomplainingly paying dozens of millions lives for the victory.

The official figures of the Soviet war losses were firstly published in 1993 and kept practically invariable till nowadays20. The irrevocable losses of the Red Army are officially estimated at 8,668,400 killed and died and the whole military and civilian losses – at 26,600,000. The military losses here are underestimated three times, the whole losses – about one and a half time. Under our estimation, based on the analysis of the Soviet censuses of population and on the information about the casualties of wounded during the whole war and data on irrevocable losses in 1942, the Red Army lost about 26,900,000 killed and died. The whole military and civilian losses we estimate at between 40,100,000 and 40,900,000 killed and died21. The official figures of the Soviet military losses are a falsification. This falsification aims to prove that the Red Army waged war not worse than the Wehrmacht and that the ratio of irrevocable losses between the Soviet troops and their enemies was only 1.7:1. The German losses, as well as losses of the German allies, are exaggerated by Grigorij F. Krivosheev’s group as large as about twice. If we take into account the real figures of the Soviet and German irrevocable losses, the ratio is about 10:1. Then the Soviet political system, generated by Stalin, showed itself quite ineffective from the point of view of the number of human losses during the Second World War.

 
2 Comments

Posted by on 18/09/2011 in Aktuāls todien, Dokumenti

 

Krievijas saistības. Ikdienas zināšanai.

 
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Posted by on 17/09/2011 in Uncategorized

 

Vēsture bija Rainim vistuvākā un mīļākā zinātne. Zināt pagātni nozīmē zināt nākotni. Atkārtosim to vēlreiz un vēlreiz visi kopā!

J.Rainis. Par vēsturi

„Vēsture no visām zinātnēm man bija no laika gala vistuvākā un mīļākā, tagad man viņa atmaksāja par to.

Zināt pagātni ir zināt nākotni; es zināju, ka mums jānāk labai nākotnei, es bēdājos, bet neizsamisu un teicu to citiem, un bija labi.”

Jānis Rainis. Kastaņola. Rīga, A.Gulbja apgādībā, 1928, 82.lpp.

 

Baltijas ārpolitikas simpozijs “laimīgo govju un laimīgo tūristu zemē” 1993. gadā – aktualitātes, kas sniedzas līdz šim laikam. Dalībnieka akcenti.

 

“Krievu vēstures Dimā” Boriss Sokolovs rīt, 15. septembrī mums sniegs divas intriģējošas lekcijas.

 

Ir daudz tādu personu, kas Borisu Sokolovu neieredz, demonizē un zākā. Jo viņš atklāti RUNĀ  par to, ko

ZINA

un KO DOMĀ.

—— Академик РАН Геннадий Осипов увидел для себя  в  Б.В. Соколове

«самого неутомимого «профессионального» фальсификатора»!

Непонятно только – во всем подлунном мире или в России… ——

Mūsdienu Krievijas “vēstures Dimā”, – pagaidām gan tikai (?) 100 grāmatu, tostarp – 2 enciklopēdiju autors,

Boriss Sokolovs rīt, 15. septembrī, Rīgā, lasīs lekcijas izredzētajiem.

Mazliet jokoju, – visi, visi esat lūgti būt klāt izcilā krievu vēsturnieka un literatūrzinātnieka, Latvijas drauga

uzstāšanās reizēs! Izredziet tieši sevi!

UN, TĀTAD:

15.septembrī notiks divas Borisa Sokolova lekcijas – aktuālās vēstures pētniekiem un interesentiem, skolotājiem, studentiem un visiem draugiem:

Plkst. 12.00 lekcija “Divpusējās vēsturnieku komisijas Austrumeiropā: kam tās vajadzīgas un ko tās dod”

Valdemāra ielā 20, 5.stāvā (labajā pusē) –

atbalsta LOIB un Latvijas vēstures mazās bibliotēkas atbalsta fonds.

Plkst. 14.30 lekcija “Skata uz Eiropu evolūcija Krievijas vēstures politikā”

Latvijas Universitātes Vēstures un filozofijas fakultātē, Mārstaļu ielā 28/30 6.auditorijā.

Atbalsta LOIB un LU Vēstures un filozofijas fakultāte.

Abas lekcijas notiks krievu valodā. Lektors epizodiski var pāriet arī uz angļu valodu.

Jautājumus varēs uzdot arī krievu un angļu valodā.

 
 

Par Rīgas iedzīvotāju pieklājīgu uzvedību savā dzīvē. Ārpuslaika … Ārpuslaika Rīgas pilsētas Domes nolikuma projekta uzgājums – ar cenzūras izšķērējumiem ?

 

No cikla “Ģeniālie molberti”. Nr. 777.

 
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Posted by on 13/09/2011 in Biogrāfijas, Galerija

 
 
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